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Abstract
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 was first encountered in 1996 in Guangdong province (China) and started
spreading throughout Asia and the western Palearctic in 2004–2006. Compared to several other countries where the HPAI
H5N1 distribution has been studied in some detail, little is known about the environmental correlates of the HPAI H5N1
distribution in China. HPAI H5N1 clinical disease outbreaks, and HPAI virus (HPAIV) H5N1 isolated from active risk-based
surveillance sampling of domestic poultry (referred to as HPAIV H5N1 surveillance positives in this manuscript) were
modeled separately using seven risk variables: chicken, domestic waterfowl population density, proportion of land covered
by rice or surface water, cropping intensity, elevation, and human population density. We used bootstrapped logistic
regression and boosted regression trees (BRT) with cross-validation to identify the weight of each variable, to assess the
predictive power of the models, and to map the distribution of HPAI H5N1 risk. HPAI H5N1 clinical disease outbreak
occurrence in domestic poultry was mainly associated with chicken density, human population density, and elevation. In
contrast, HPAIV H5N1 infection identified by risk-based surveillance was associated with domestic waterfowl density, human
population density, and the proportion of land covered by surface water. Both models had a high explanatory power (mean
AUC ranging from 0.864 to 0.967). The map of HPAIV H5N1 risk distribution based on active surveillance data emphasized
areas south of the Yangtze River, while the distribution of reported outbreak risk extended further North, where the density
of poultry and humans is higher. We quantified the statistical association between HPAI H5N1 outbreak, HPAIV distribution
and post-vaccination levels of seropositivity (percentage of effective post-vaccination seroconversion in vaccinated birds)
and found that provinces with either outbreaks or HPAIV H5N1 surveillance positives in 2007–2009 appeared to have had
lower antibody response to vaccination. The distribution of HPAI H5N1 risk in China appears more limited geographically
than previously assessed, offering prospects for better targeted surveillance and control interventions.
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Introduction
HPAI H5N1 virus infection was first encountered in China in
1996 in the southern part of the country with the discovery of a
virus that killed geese in Guangdong province (Goose/GD/96)
[1]. In 1997, Hong-Kong experienced the first major outbreak of
HPAI H5N1 associated with several human deaths, alerting the
international community to the potential threat caused by this new
strain of HPAI virus (HPAIV). Between 1999 and 2003, the virus
underwent a series of evolutionary changes and multiple genotypes
of HPAIV H5N1 detected through routine live bird market
surveillance in southern China emerged, indicating that the virus
was still active and widely circulating [2]. However, the first major
outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in mainland China started in January
2004 in Guangxi autonomous region, in southern China,
bordering Vietnam. As the outbreak unfolded, the disease was
detected widely throughout the country, causing over 110
outbreaks in 23 provinces since the onset of the epidemic and
leading to the culling of more than 35 million poultry to curb the
spread of the disease.
To answer the challenge of controlling HPAI H5N1 across such
a vast territory characterized by a diversity of agricultural
production systems and economic development, China has taken
several important steps to confront and control outbreaks and deal
with the occurrence of human cases. These steps include measures
such as stamping out, movement controls, cleaning and disinfec-
tion of infected premises, and the adoption of a nationwide
massive vaccination campaign combined with intensive post-
vaccination surveillance efforts. Effective vaccines have been
developed and disease outbreaks have been responded to in a
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contain the disease and drastically reducing the number of
outbreaks over the past years, with no outbreak detected in 2010.
The year 2005 represented a turning point in the control strategy
with the enforcement of a so-called universal vaccination
campaign, when vaccination became compulsory for all poultry
using the H5N1 Re-1 (A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96-PR8) vaccine
strain. In parallel, a large amount of surveillance testing has been
conducted both at provincial and national levels with the
collection of an average of 4.7 million samples every year during
the period 2007–2009 for the detection of silent viral circulation,
the possible emergence of new strains and ultimately the
identification of potential vaccination failure. Through the
national surveillance program for the monitoring of HPAIV
H5N1 circulation, the virus has been regularly detected,
generating essential information for understanding the infection
distribution pattern. More specifically, it has provided evidence
that, despite a reduction in reported HPAI H5N1 outbreaks, some
parts of the country still offer a favorable breeding ground for
influenza viruses to circulate and potentially novel strains to
emerge, representing a threat for the generation of new influenza
pandemic strains. This particularly applies to the southern part of
the country, which has historically been referred to as a
hypothetical influenza epicenter [3] where agricultural and
cultural practices place man and animals in close proximity.
However, very few studies have actually attempted to map the
potential distribution of avian influenza disease and infection risk
across the diversity of ecological, cultural and production systems
present in China. This lack of a sound description of HPAIV
H5N1 geographical niches makes it difficult to refine control
strategies that rely heavily on vaccination and that would greatly
benefit from more targeted risk management. Better understand-
ing of the infection dynamic pattern, the environmental and
ecological factors associated with persistence of the disease in
various poultry production systems will significantly strengthen
efforts to achieve disease control and exclude infection from major
poultry production centers, thus optimizing resources allocated to
controlling the disease and reducing the risk for human infection.
This study aimed to analyze the interrelationship of HPAI
H5N1 in China with its environment, by exploring the association
between selected spatial risk factors and two different indicators of
HPAIV H5N1 presence, namely reported clinical outbreak
occurrence in poultry and detection of sub-clinical HPAIV
infection through risk-based surveillance. The study benefits from
several improvements over previous work [4]. First, the analysis is
not only based on HPAI H5N1 outbreak data which are of limited
value in a context of massive vaccination (especially after the
implementation of the national vaccination campaign which
began towards the end of 2005), but also uses the results of HPAI
H5N1 monitoring implemented as part of the national active
surveillance program in live bird markets from 2007 to 2009,
termed risk-based surveillance in the rest of this manuscript. We
also make use of an estimation of vaccine efficacy as measured by
the Haemagglutination Inhibition (HI) test of serological samples
collected monthly from poultry at province level. Second, we use
updated poultry census data that differentiates between chicken,
ducks and geese. This distinction is important as shown by
previous HPAI H5N1 disease mapping efforts [5,6], and is
probably associated with differences in susceptibility to HPAI
H5N1 virus between these species. Third, we used and compared
the outputs of bootstrapped logistic regression and boosted
regression trees with cross-validation, so that we could robustly
estimate the weight of each tested risk factor, the goodness of fit of
our predictions, and to allow us to map both the prediction of risk
as well as its uncertainty.
Methods
Data
Two types of data relating to HPAI H5N1 presence have been
used as dependent variables in this study.
First, poultry HPAI H5N1 disease outbreak data were compiled
from two main sources:(1)one beingtheOfficialVeterinarybulletin
published on the website of the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture
(MoA; http://www.agri.gov.cn/); and (2) the other source coming
from official reports to the World Organisation for Animal Health
(OIE) that were compared with MoA’s report. Where there was an
inconsistency in the outbreak date or location, we obtained accurate
datathroughwebresearchandconsultationoflocalexperts.Ninety-
five percent of poultry outbreak data had detailed address
information which was then geocoded. The remaining 5% for
which no accurate location could be obtained were geocoded using
the prefecture centroid (administrative level 4).
Second, the Ministry of Agriculture in China routinely
coordinates a surveillance program twice a year at the national
level and monthly at provincial level in live bird markets consisting
of sampling domestic poultry for the detection of HPAIV H5N1.
The selection of markets is based on their characteristics with
regard to size, trade and hygiene practices which are assumed to
increase the likelihood of detecting the virus. All samples collected
at provincial level are tested by polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
All AI positive samples are sent to the Harbin National Veterinary
Research Institute for confirmation, subtyping and virus isolation.
The positive HPAIV H5N1 findings are then reported at the
central government level and the data are released by the
Veterinary Bureau in the MOA through the monthly Official
Veterinary Bulletin, from which we extracted data on positive
identification of HPAIV H5N1 between January 2007 and
September 2009. The surveillance data were geocoded using the
market location when the market name was available. For 15% of
the data, however, this information was missing and positives were
geocoded using the prefecture centroid.
Author Summary
The geographical distribution of highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) H5N1 and agro-ecological risk factors
have been studied in a number of countries in Southeast
Asia. However, little is know of its distribution in China
where HPAI H5N1 first emerged in 1996, evolved, and
spread throughout Asia and the western Palearctic in
2004–2006. This study analyzes separately the distribution,
in domestic poultry, of HPAI virus (HPAIV) H5N1 isolated
from active risk-based surveillance sampling and HPAI
H5N1 clinical disease outbreaks. These data are analyzed in
relation to the distribution of chicken and domestic
waterfowl population density, proportion of land covered
by rice or surface water, cropping intensity, elevation, and
human population density. HPAI H5N1 viruses identified
by risk-based surveillance are found to be associated with
domestic waterfowl density, human population density,
and the proportion of land covered by surface water. In
contrast, HPAI H5N1 clinical disease outbreak occurrences
were mainly associated with chicken density, human
population density, and low elevation. These results show
that the distribution of HPAI H5N1 risk in China appears
more limited geographically than previously assessed,
offering prospects for better targeted surveillance and
control interventions.
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post-vaccination seropositive samples was also extracted from the
Monthly Official Veterinary Bulletin at the province level. Post-
vaccination monitoring is performed on a regular basis at
provincial level to assess the efficacy of the vaccination. Chickens,
ducks and geese are sampled 21 days post-immunisation and an
effective immune response is defined as a sero-conversion in bird
with titres .4Log2 when measured by HI test, using homologous
antigen, similar to the vaccine strain. Similar to the surveillance
results, post-vaccination serological results obtained are collected
at national level and published in the Official Veterinary Bulletin.
The spatial distribution of HPAI H5N1 was investigated using a
set of 7 explanatory variables which are known to be important risk
factors, based on published scientific evidence and expert opinion.
First, we considered the abundance of chickens, and domestic
waterfowl separately based on previous work that had demonstrated
a weak positive association between HPAI H5N1 presence and
chicken density [6,7], but a stronger association with duck density
[5]. Second, anthropogenic variables were found to be associated
with HPAI H5N1 in a number of studies conducted in countries
with very different agro-ecological conditions such as Thailand,
Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Romania [6,8,7,9,10], and we therefore
chose to include human population density. Third, several studies
also identified land use and cropping variables as significant
predictors of HPAI H5N1 presence in Asia. For example, Pfeiffer et
al. [7] found HPAI H5N1 to be associated with the proportion of
land occupied by aquaculture and by rice paddy fields in Vietnam,
and Gilbert et al. [6] found a strong association with rice cropping
intensity in Thailand. Similarly, statistically significant effects of
access to water, or density of waterways were identified by Biswas et
al [11] for Bangladesh and Ward et al. [12] for Romania.
Therefore, we decided to include three variables: the proportion
of land occupied by water (running water or water bodies), the
proportion of land occupied by rice paddy fields, and the cropping
intensity (number of crops cultivated in an unit area of cropland
over a year). Finally, we included elevation in our analysis since
several studies have reported an increased HPAI H5N1 risk in
lowland and river delta areas [6,7,13]. The risk factor variables and
corresponding data sources are presented in Table 1.
The analysis was carried out at a spatial resolution of 0.0833
decimal degrees of latitude and longitude (approximately 5.5 to
8.8 km for the study area comprised between 54 and 18 degrees of
latitude north). The statistical methods used in this study required
having risk factor variable values for a large set of locations where
HPAIV H5N1 or HPAI H5N1 outbreaks would be considered
absent (negatives), so as to contrast the agro-ecological conditions
associated with HPAIV H5N1 or HPAI H5N1 outbreaks presence
(positives). Negatives were selected randomly from throughout the
country based on three conditions: i) no HPAI H5N1 outbreaks
had been reported and no HPAIV H5N1 positive results had been
obtained from the active risk-based surveillance; ii) being at a
minimum distance .0.0833 decimal degree of any positive; and
iii) being in a location where human population density was .1
person/km
2 to exclude desert and high mountain areas from the
analysis since the focus of this analysis was on locations with likely
relevance for disease maintenance in poultry.
Analysis
Two approaches were used to model the spatial distribution of
HPAI H5N1 presence or absence: multiple logistic regression and
boosted regression trees (BRT). Logistic regression allows
predicting a variable with a binary response, such as the presence
or absence of a disease, as a function of a number of variables, or
predictors. Logistic regression models have been used in a number
of studies trying to identify environmental correlates and risk
factors associated with HPAI H5N1 presence [6,7,10]. However,
one limitation of logistic regression is the necessity to perform
specific adjustments to accommodate non-linearity of effect of the
continuous-scale risk factors on the logit form of the outcome
variable. Two approaches have been described to account for this.
First, a risk factor can be added to the model as a quadratic term
so that predicted probabilities of presence can be maximum (or
minimum) for intermediate values (e.g. [6,9]). Second, each
continuous-scale risk factor variable is converted into a nominal-
scale variable where each category level represents a particular
range of values in the original variable (e.g. [14,7,10]). However,
both methods have their limitations. The first method can only
partially model more complex non-linear dependencies, and the
second method is sensitive to the range of values represented by
each category level. In the presence of spatial autocorrelation,
logistic regression requires the use of relatively complex estimation
algorithms. BRT has been developed relatively recently for
predicting the distribution of organisms [15]. It is very efficient
for dealing with non-linear relationships and interactions between
variables. It can be considered a disadvantage that it does not have
the facility to assess the statistical significance of individual effect
variables, though it allows estimating the relative importance of
each variable to the predictions. In a comprehensive review of
presence/absence distribution modeling methods, Elith et al. [16]
found BRT to perform best along with the maximum entropy
method. Elith et al. [15] published a detailed description of an
analysis approach using BRT which implements a cross-validation
procedure allowing identification of model parameters. In this
study, we compare logistic regression and BRT in terms of validity
and ease of interpretation of the outputs. We also discuss our
findings in relation to the spatial patterns of HPAI H5N1
described in previously published work that used logistic regression
methods.
In the logistic regression method, all variables were forced in the
model, and the likelihood ratio test was used to assess the
contribution of each variable to the predictions. For the BRT
model, we used 10 sets of training and test points for cross-
validation, a tree complexity of 4, a learning rate of 0.005 and a
bag fraction of 75%. Using those parameters, the cross-validation
stepwise function presented by Elith et al. [15] was used to identify
the optimal number of trees in the model. The weight of each
variable estimated over the identified number of trees was used as
an indicator of each variable’s importance for predicting HPAI
H5N1 presence/absence. One should note that those weights are
not absolute metrics, and the weights of all variables of a BRT
Table 1. Risk factor variables used in the analysis.
Abbreviation Description Transform Source
ChDnLg Chickens/km
2 Log10[x+1] Robinson et al. [42]
DuGeDnLg Domestic waterfowls/km
2 Log10[x+1] Robinson et al. [42]
HpDnLg People/km
2 Log10[x+1] GRUMP [43]
WaPc % land occupied
by water
- Jiyuan et al. [44]
RiPc % land occupied
by rice crop
- Jiyuan et al. [44]
Cint Average cropping
intensity
- Xiao et al. [45]
DemLg Mean Elevation Log10[x+1] GTOPO30 [46]
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001308.t001
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variables, first HPAI H5N1 outbreak occurrence during the entire
study period and second HPAIV H5N1 positive findings between
2007 and 2009.
Assessing the performance of our models directly from the logistic
regression and BRT predicted probabilities and observed presence/
absence had two main limitations. First, logistic regression perfor-
mance metrics have been shown to be sensitive to low (,10%) and
high (.90%) frequencies of the binary outcome categories [17]. The
proportion of positives in our dataset was extremely low, and it was
therefore necessary to address this potential bias (to our knowledge,
thepresence ofthispotential biashasnotbeen thoroughly assessed for
BRT models, but see [18]). Second, quantifying model performances
using the data set used to train the model tends to inflate the
performance metrics compared to a situation where an independent
data set is used. We developed a bootstrapping procedure aiming to
generate a robust estimate of model performance by simultaneously
addressing those two limitations.
The bootstrapping analysis involved a series of sequential steps:
(i) selection of a balanced subset of data from the complete dataset:
all n points with HPAI H5N1 presence were included and an
equivalent number of absence points was randomly selected from
all ‘absence’ points; (ii) creating a training data set and a test data
set: the balanced subset of data was randomly divided into two
subsets: one for building the models (training set, with 75% of the
points) and the other for evaluating the models (test set, with the
remaining 25% of the points); (iii) model development: a logistic
regression and a BRT model were built using the training set, and
parameters of both models were stored; (iv) model evaluation: the
model equations from the logistic regression and BRT models
were used to generate predictions using the test set, which in turn
were assessed using ROC curves, areas under the curve and
Cohen’s kappa statistic; (v) risk maps: maps of the predictions
produced by each model were stored. Steps (i) to (v) were repeated
50 times, and the mean and standard deviation of all statistics and
predicted spatial distributions were estimated.
Due to percentage of post-vaccination seropositivity only being
available at province level, using yearly data for the period 2007-
2009 as unit of analysis, a separate analysis was conducted to
quantify the statistical association between antibody response to
vaccination expressed as a percentage and two variables: the
presence/absence of HPAI H5N1 outbreak records in the province
and detectionofH5N1HPAIVdetectedthrough nationalrisk-based
surveillance activities conducted by the MoA. The post-vaccination
seropositivity was analysed as the response variable of a two-way
ANOVA with the presence/absence of HPAI H5N1 outbreak
records in the province and the year as two explanatory factors. The
same analysis was carried out with the presence/absence of H5N1
HPAIV detected through national risk-based surveillance activities
and year as explanatory factors. This allowed separating the effect of
HPAI H5N1 status from the possible effect of time.
Results
The distribution of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks and HPAIV H5N1
surveillance positives are shown in Fig. 1. Overall, the two analysis
Figure 1. Distribution of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks (grey square) and HPAI H5N1 positive samples identified through surveillance
(black triangles) in China.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001308.g001
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in terms of risk factors being identified. In contrast, the set of risk
factors and their effect differed strongly between the outcomes of
reported HPAI H5N1 outbreak and risk-based surveillance data.
Based on the logistic regression results, HPAI H5N1 outbreaks
were found to be positively associated with human population
density and negatively with elevation (Table 2). The BRT models
also identified chicken density to be an important variable for
discriminating between locations with and without reported HPAI
H5N1 outbreaks (BRT weights, Table 2). The averaged BRT
model fitted functions shown in Fig. 2 allow a detailed description
of these relationships (maps of the predictions coefficient of
variation are presented in Figure S1 in Text S1). The predicted
risk of HPAI H5N1 outbreak occurrence appears to be constant
for densities of chickens ranging from 0 to 10,000 heads/km
2, then
increases to a maximum risk at around 100,000 heads/km
2. The
predicted risk also increases significantly with human population
density, starting from a density of 1,000 people/km
2. We also
identify a strong negative relationship with elevation, with the
predicted risk function showing two levels, a high risk for elevation
ranging from 0–100 m, and a low risk for higher elevations. The
predicted risk is relatively flat for all ranges of domestic waterfowl
density and percentage of land with surface water.
Incontrast,HPAIVH5N1surveillancepositiveswere foundtobe
positively associated with the density of domestic waterfowl, with
percentage of land occupied by water and to human population
density (though this factor was not important in the BRT models),
and negatively associated with chicken density (Table 2). Here
again, the predicted risk function of the BRT models allows a
detailed descriptionof these relationships (Fig. 2).The predicted risk
of HPAIV H5N1 surveillance positives is constant for waterfowl
densityrangingbetween0 and 10,000 heads/km
2,thenrisessharply
for increasing densities. A similar profile as for the HPAI H5N1
outbreak data is found for the association with human population
density, with predicted risk increasing with human population
density from a density of 1,000 people/km
2. The predicted risk
increases with percentage of area covered by surface water up to a
value of approximately 7%, and then remains constant for higher
values. The profiles of predicted risk as a function of chicken density
and elevation are relatively constant.
The accuracy metrics of the predictions produced by the logistic
regression and BRT models are good to excellent, with mean AUC
values estimated using the evaluation dataset ranging from 0.864 to
0.967 (Fig. 3). One can note that, as expected, the AUC estimated
based on the training data is always better than that estimated using
the evaluation dataset, and that this difference is much higher for
theBRTmodels. However, even when assessed usingtheevaluation
dataset, the accuracy of BRT models appears better than that of the
logistic regression models. In addition, the accuracy metrics are
higherforthe modelsforHPAIV H5N1 risk-based surveillancedata
than those obtained for the HPAI H5N1 outbreak data. One can
note that considering only eastern China in the evaluation of AUC
values slightly reduces it’s value, but to a marginal extent, showing
that the good predictive power does not result from predicting risk
over wide desert areas unsuitable to disease spread.
The predicted geographical distribution of HPAI H5N1 presence
also differs according to the type of training data (clinical disease
outbreaks vs. risk-based surveillance; Fig. 4). Maps generated based
on the outbreak data place more emphasis than those based on risk-
based surveillance data on north-eastern regions where chicken
densities are higher. We also note a marked difference for the
outbreak data between the outputs of the logistic regression model
and of the BRT, the latter predicting many more clustered areas
with high probability of HPAI H5N1 presence. In contrast, the
Table 2. Results of the bootstrapped logistic regression model and boosted regression trees applied to clinical HPAI H5N1 disease
outbreak and HPAIV H5N1 serological surveillance data.
Logistic regression
Boosted regression
tree
Variable Coef (mean) Coef. (SD) Ch. Dev. Rem. p value Weight (mean) Weight (SD)
Outbreak data (n pos.=184)
Constant 22.300 1.731
ChDnLg 0.288 0.340 0.76 n.s. 23.53 9.15
DuGeDnLg 20.324 0.332 0.80 n.s. 7.22 2.93
HpDnLg 1.544 0.446 31.10 ,0.001 28.66 8.54
DemLg 21.187 0.346 15.46 ,0.001 21.08 9.05
WaPc 2.268 7.058 0.85 n.s. 6.71 2.95
RiPc 0.233 1.281 0.42 n.s. 3.26 1.93
Cint 21.256 0.910 3.41 0.0650 9.54 3.33
Surveillance data (n pos.=86)
Constant 211.404 4.565
ChDnLg 21.862 0.835 7.04 0.00797 3.62 2.01
DuGeDnLg 2.120 1.112 10.57 0.00115 36.86 17.21
HpDnLg 2.464 0.701 17.81 ,0.001 29.01 15.97
DemLg 0.394 0.813 0.78 n.s. 3.72 2.39
WaPc 20.802 23.022 5.08 0.0242 18.76 12.14
RiPc 20.571 2.437 0.45 n.s. 2.71 1.57
Cint 20.434 1.656 0.44 n.s. 5.31 2.22
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001308.t002
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PLoS Pathogens | www.plospathogens.org 6 March 2011 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e1001308distribution of predicted HPAIV H5N1 presence based on risk-
based surveillance data identifies areas at risk much more
concentrated in the southern part of the country, with outputs
from the logistic and BRT models showing similar patterns.
In the analysis at province level, we found that the proportion
of seropositivity in post-vaccination surveys was lower in
provinces that had reported HPAI H5N1 outbreaks than in
those that did not (Fig. 5 left; two-way ANOVA with both year
and HPAI H5N1 outbreak status as factor variables; HPAI H5N1
outbreak status: F1,87=18.53, p,0.001; Year: F1,87=0.51, n.s.;
interaction term - Year by HPAI H5N1 outbreak status:
F1,87=0.0264, n.s.), and in provinces where HPAIV H5N1 had
been detected during active surveillance and than in those where
this had not been the case (Fig. 5 right; two-way ANOVA with
both year and HPAIV H5N1 risk-based surveillance status as
factor variables; HPAIV H5N1 risk-based surveillance status:
F1,87=5.09, p=0.026; Year: F1,87=2.02, n.s.; interaction term -
year by HPAIV H5N1 risk-based surveillance status:
F1,87=0.172, n.s.).
Discussion
In China, where approximately 15 billion head of poultry are
produced annually with a standing population of 5.6 billion
chickens, 760 million ducks and 300 million geese, major regional
differences are apparent in ecological systems, husbandry
practices, cultural behaviors and economic development with a
consequential impact on the distribution of infectious diseases
including HPAI H5N1, as well as their maintenance and spread
and therefore on disease control options.
To date, spatial studies aiming at identifying HPAI H5N1 risk
factors have been undertaken in many countries where the disease was
introduced such as Thailand and Vietnam [5,6,14,8,7,19], Korea
[20], India and Bangladesh [9,11,21], Romania [22,23] or Africa
[24,25]. Only three studies analyzed the distribution of HPAI H5N1
outbreaks in China [4,26]. Of these, only the study by Fang et al. [4]
attempts to map the distribution of HPAI H5N1 risk. Whilst highly
valuable given that it is the first analysis, the output predicts areas at
high risk in ecological areas that would not support the maintenance
Figure 2. Relationship between risk factors and HPAI H5N1 risk function. The HPAI H5N1 risk functions of the BRT models is plotted as a
function of chicken density (ChDnLg, log10 scale), domestic waterfowl density (DuGeDnLg, log10 scale), human population density (HpDnLg, log10
scale), elevation (DemLg, log10 scale), and percentage of land covered by water (WaPc) based on HPAI H5N1 clinical disease outbreak (five first plots)
and HPAIV H5N1 risk-based surveillance data (five last plots). The grey lines present the predicted line for each bootstrap, and the black line is the
average across all bootstraps.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001308.g002
Figure 3. ROC curves of the predicted risk of HPAI H5N1 presence/absence. Left and right plots are the ROC curves of the bootstrapped
logistic regression models and BRT models, respectively. Top and bottom plots are the ROC curves of the models based on HPAI H5N1 clinical disease
outbreak data, and HPAIV H5N1 risk-based surveillance data, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001308.g003
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regions of Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang autonomous regions.
Inourstudy,wereporteddifferentresultsfortheanalysesbased on
outbreak and risk-based surveillance data. The distribution of
reported HPAI H5N1 outbreaks was found to be primarily
associated with lowland regions with high human population and
chicken density. In contrast, HPAIV H5N1 presence detected
through risk-based surveillance activities was found to be associated
with regions with high waterfowl densities and were covered by high
proportions of surface water. This result is very interesting since it
may be a reflection of differences in HPAIV H5N1 pathogenicity
between chickens and ducks, combined with environmental and host
population conditions supporting virus spread and clinical disease
outbreakoccurrenceasdistinctfromclinicallysilentviruspersistence.
Figure 4. Predicted distribution of HPAI H5N1 risk. Predictions are displayed according to the bootstrapped logistic regression model (left) and
boosted regression trees (right), based on reported HPAI H5N1 clinical disease outbreak data (top), or HPAIV H5N1 risk-based surveillance data
(bottom).
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001308.g004
Figure 5. Province-level percentage of post-vaccination sero-positivity as a function of disease/infection status. The left and right
plots are based on reported HPAI H5N1 clinical disease outbreak data and HPAIV H5N1 risk-based surveillance data, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001308.g005
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[27,28], though there is also evidence of significant variability in
virulence at the species level [29]. In the absence of control or
prevention measures, the spread of HPAIV H5N1 and occurrence
of clinical disease outbreaks is facilitated in regions where the
density of chickens is particularly high, especially in intensive and
industrial conditions where high numbers of animals are together
facilitating transmission. Such regions are encountered in the
north-eastern part of China, where the low cost of grain feed
production and a fast-rising demand for poultry meat has
supported the rapid development of intensive chicken production.
Those intensive poultry production systems invest significant
resources in disease prevention measures, and will apply mass-
vaccination of their flocks, thereby preventing HPAIV H5N1
spread within and between farms. However, it is likely given the
exceptionally high density of chickens and farms that occasional,
albeit rare, lapses in vaccination coverage result in a small number
of outbreaks. The human population density risk factor can be
interpreted as a proxy of several epidemiological processes that are
more likely to occur in highly-populated areas, such as a higher
likelihood of outbreak detection and higher possibilities of HPAIV
H5N1 transmission through trade and farming-related activities.
In contrast, long-term persistence of HPAIV H5N1 can only be
possible if the virus can circulate without being detected or reported.
D o m e s t i cd u c k sh a v eb e e ns h o w nt ob ea b l et oe x c r e t el a r g ea m o u n t s
of virus whilst remaining apparently healthy [27]. Regions rich in
domestic waterfowl are hence more prone to long-term persistence of
HPAIV H5N1. This can be further exacerbated in geographical areas
with an abundance of surface water. Permanent water bodies, rivers,
rice paddy fieldsand canals are the habitat of wild and domestic ducks.
One may speculate that water facilitates the transmission between
hosts without direct contact through the faecal excretion of the virus,
its persistence in the water, and the oral infection of other susceptible
hosts sharing the same pond or downstream canal or river. The results
indicating that HPAIV H5N1 presence detected through risk-based
surveillance is associated with areas that have high waterfowl densities
and a high proportion of surface water allows thus a straightforward
interpretation. Associations between HPAIV H5N1 and domestic
duck density had already been identified in other countries [5,7].
However, no difference between outbreaks and clinically-silent
infections was made in these earlier studies, which indeed becomes
essential when analyzing HPAIV H5N1 distribution in the context of
mass-vaccination such as in China.
Interestingly, the farming and cultural practices encountered in
these regions were already described by Shortridge 28 years ago as
an avian influenza breeding ground [30]. Among others, Southern
China still hosts a massive duck population raised on ponds and
rice fields, facilitating frequent faecal-oral transmission of multiple
influenza subtypes leading to a year-round and inter-epidemic
occurrence of influenza viruses. Historically, agricultural practices
in China have developed from the need to feed the people as
efficiently as possible, using all available resources, and with little
recourse to modern farming methods. Domestic ducks were first
moved from rivers to cultivated rice fields at the start of the Qing
dynasty in the middle of the 17th century [31,32] to help protect
the growing rice from pests. This practice reduces farmers’
dependence on chemical insecticides, herbicides, fertilizers and
mechanical farming aids and provides a close association between
bird, water, rice and people. Ducks raised in ponds are also an
important feature in the villages and communities of China,
especially in southern China and coastal areas including the
waterways of the Pearl River delta which are ideal for rice and fish
farming [30]. Furthermore, southern China has always been the
focus of influenza experts’ attention and often been referred as a
hypothetical epicenter of AI pandemic strains. The foundation of
this concept was originally raised by Webster et al. [33] and
supported by the wide variety of influenza virus subtypes
discovered in Southern China during decades [34–37]. More
specifically, the distribution of HPAIV H5N1 risk of persistence
inferred from the risk-based virological surveillance data and using
the logistic and BRT models is similar and highlights different
levels of risk according to the following ecological regions (Fig. 4,
bottom; see Figure S2 in Text S1 for a map of the zones):
Zone I) In Southern China a large potential zone of virus
persistence extends from south of the Yangtze River. This area
hosts the vast majority of the Chinese duck population comprising
birds for meat or egg production. This area can be subdivided into
three areas: I-a) an area which extends from the provinces of
Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangxi autonomous
region down to Guangdong province. This might be one of the
most important ecological zones where key epidemiological drivers
for emergence, persistence and spread are present, including a
huge reservoir population, traditional farming system, a high
animal and human population density, some major wild bird
congregation sites such as the Poyang lake located in Jiangxi
province and an important North – South gradient of poultry
trade which crosses this region. This supports the hypothesis of a
wider and slightly displaced epicenter of influenza viruses, not only
concentrated around the Pearl River delta in Guangdong province
but extending south of the Yangtze River and including provinces
such as Jiangxi where internal segments of the 1996 geese HPAI
H5N1 virus may have originated [38]. I-b) A coastal area
stretching from Jiangsu to Guangdong provinces with a risk
hotspot in Guangdong province along the Pearl River delta. This
strip of coastal land also hosts the typical duck pond system where
the risk of infection and disease is present. I-c) Few isolated areas
within this geographical zone displaying an increased risk located
in Yunnan, Guangxi autonomous region, Guizhou, Sichuan and
Chongqing provinces which have experienced either outbreaks in
the past (Guangxi autonomous region and Yunnan) or only
reported viral circulation (Sichuan and Chongqing provinces).
Zone II) A vast geographical area in the West and North,
displaying radically different geography, socio-economic and
animal production features and characterized by scattered and
isolated spots of higher predicted risk. This includes specifically
southern Tibet autonomous region and scattered areas in the
North and South of Xinjiang autonomous region where sporadic
outbreaks have occurred in the past.
Zone III) In the North-East of the Yangtze River, a region where
the contribution to disease persistence seems fairly limited while
localized areas at higher risk of outbreaks encroach regions of
intensive production where the disease could rapidly spread in case
of virus introduction and breach in biosecurity. This region extends
from Shangdong into Liaoning, Jilin and Helongjiang provinces.
These provinces are characterized by denser human population and
large-scale commercial poultry production, and were predicted as
high risk based on the reported clinical disease outbreak data (Fig. 4
top). In these regions of North-Eastern China, chicken production
and marketing systems are intensifying and concentrating in
responsetoeconomicgrowthandurbanization.Substantialnumbers
of poultry are now processed at large-scale slaughterhouses in this
region, while themajority of poultryare stillsoldthrough livepoultry
markets in the South of the country. In the colder north-eastern
provinces water birds are also housed and kept more intensively.
The apparent persistence of HPAIV H5N1 in those regions has
two main implications. First, given the possible presence of silent
infection involving an extremely high population of domestic
waterfowl, eradication of the virus through massive vaccination
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the number of outbreaks. Vaccination has been one major
component of the government policy to curb the spread of the
disease and reduce the incidence of outbreaks of clinical disease
and of transmission of infection. China uses more vaccine against
avian influenza than any other country and Chinese veterinary
authorities base much of their control and preventive strategy
around vaccination [39–41]. More than 13 billion doses of AI
vaccine have been used each year since 2007 [39] and the
objectives of the national strategy are to reach a 100% vaccination
coverage for the national poultry population and to ensure an
effective immune response (defined as sero-conversion in bird with
titres .4Log2 when measured by HI test) in more than 70% of the
nationwide poultry population all year round. In this study, we
also analyzed the post-vaccination surveillance data collected at
provincial level since January 2007 and found that provinces
where clinical HPAI H5N1 outbreaks had been reported or
HPAIV H5N1 detected had a lower level of post-vaccination
seropositivity, confirming that increased protection does indeed
result in lower disease outbreak or infection risks but would require
an approach better targeted at identified high risk areas to
drastically reduce the viral load in the environment.
Second, the different regions of China are not independent and
are possibly epidemiologically linked through poultry trade and
likely also through wild bird migrations. High production-demand
discrepancies lead to long-distance trade of poultry products (e.g.
chicken from the north exported to southern provinces, or duck
meat exported from the south to the north). In addition, areas such
as the Poyang lake, where a large population of domestic
waterfowl is raised in close proximity to thousands of over-
wintering wild waterfowl, could favour the transmission between
wild and domestic waterfowl and lead to long-distance transmis-
sion of the virus. As a consequence, the persistence of HPAIV
H5N1 in some particular regions may influence the chances of
introduction into other more distant regions. For instance, the wild
bird 2.2 clade which was associated with the origin of the Qinghai
lake epidemic in 2005 in West China was responsible for a major
outbreak during the same year in domestic poultry in Liaoning
province, in the north eastern part of the country. Likewise, the
2006 Shanxi strain also grouped into the clade 7 cluster present in
North-Central China has been found in Jiangsu province in South
Eastern China. There is a complex pattern of links that exists
between these different ecological regions that offers hiatuses for
viruses to escape their reservoir areas and invade others.
Continued efforts pursued by the Ministry of Agriculture, its
affiliated research centers and local veterinary authorities to
strengthen the HPAI national surveillance program and its control
strategy have resulted in a steady decrease in the number of
outbreaks reported since 2004 and a better understanding of
HPAIV H5N1 infection distribution in space, time and within
traditional marketing systems known as live bird markets.
However, national surveillance programs have also demonstrat-
ed that HPAIV H5N1 continues to circulate in poultry on a
regular basis. Since 2007, an apparent increase in virus detection is
believed to represent the result of increased and intensive efforts
made by the Ministry of Agriculture to detect the virus through
targeted risk-based surveillance activities at live bird markets and
high-risk farms in a context of massive vaccination efforts that
could potentially mask the clinical expression of the disease within
a large population of immunized birds.
Although the epidemiology of HPAIV H5N1 in China does not
seem to present radically different features compared with
neighboring countries also affected by the disease, it remains
unique in terms of the abundance of reservoir species both
domestic or wild, providing ample opportunities for a sustained
and rapid evolution of the virus and requiring intensive virus
monitoring for pandemic preparedness matters. While revisiting
the concept of epicenter for pandemic strains of avian origin, the
results of this study represent major improvements over previous
efforts in mapping the risk of HPAI H5N1 in two main aspects.
First, it allows identifying several risk factors of animal,
environmental and anthropogenic nature, with clear biological
and epidemiological interpretation. Second, the bootstrapped
statistical modeling allows us to robustly estimate the predictive
power of our model, but also to map the uncertainty that goes with
our predictions (Figure S1 in Text S1), which is useful information
for an applied use of these maps.
Combining innovative modeling techniques with data of
improved quality and integrating measures of infection persis-
tence, our results have broad fundamental implications in a
country where understanding of the ecology of influenza viruses,
although of utmost importance for pandemic preparedness
purposes, has remained until now mostly speculative.
Finally, the analyses presented in this study may be improved in
thefuture byseveral complementaryapproaches. First,thepotential
transmission through trade patterns and bird migration should be
more comprehensively assessed. An increasing amount of data are
beingcollectedonbothaspects,andthiswillultimatelycontributeto
better understanding of how areas of high potential for HPAIV
H5N1 persistence may be connected to each others. Second, the
results could be further integrated into an Asia-wide improved
understanding of HPAIV H5N1 distribution models, benefiting
from several studies that have been undertaken in neighboring
countries. Third, information on true negatives obtained through
the national surveillance programme would reduce the risk of
including false-negatives in the analyses, and provide higher
resolution estimates of the relative importance of risk factors.
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